MR Book Reviews

TO END A WAR, Richard Holbrooke, Random House, NY, 1998, 145 pages, $25.95.

Richard Holbrooke will enter history as the "architect of the 1995 Dayton Agreements," which ended the war in former Yugoslavia and helped reconfigure the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Muslim, Croatian and Bosnian-Serbian sections. Holbrooke's book reflects the self-assuredness, and sometimes self-righteousness, of a man who has recently brought an impressive piece of inventive diplomacy to a favorable conclusion.

To End A War resembles a political thriller with an a seemingly happy ending. Holbrooke threatens, appeases and rages while dealing with his counterparts and adversaries who do their utmost to frustrate him. Sometimes the jealous Europeans seem to be more in the camp of the adversaries—traditionally the domain of the Balkan leaders—than their counterparts. The irritating, oversensitive French ministry of foreign affairs and the obstinate UN commander lead this phantasmagoria.

Many outside negotiators, both military and civilian, could not stand the Machiavellian intrigues and ever-present obstructionists and ran from the scene after too much opposition and too little result. Holbrooke held out. The main difference, of course, was that Holbrooke did not suffer under many hesitating, divided masters. He could threaten with the big stick of US military power.

Holbrooke was not really satisfied with the results, however. "There will be other Bosnias in our lives," he warned. This became true too swiftly, in Albania and Kosovo, where Holbrooke again worked as a political troubleshooter. But this time he had considerably less success, probably to the malicious pleasure of the politicians and mediators he had heavily criticized previously. The future will eventually reveal the real value of Richard Holbrooke's efforts.

MAJ Tijs van Lieshout
Royal Netherlands Army

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR FOR THE INFORMATION AGE, Robert R. Leonhard, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1998, 304 pages, $29.95.

Robert R. Leonhard's thesis in *The Principles of War for the Information Age* is that current principles of war did not work well in the Industrial Age and certainly will not work in the Information Age. He proposes reexamining the principles of war and provides a conceptual framework to replace the current nine "aphorisms": mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity.

Leonhard believes that current principles focus on the tactical level of war, have limited value when considering operational art or military strategy and apply mainly to Napoleonic-era battles. He also believes the current single word list is too simplistic, of limited use and should be replaced by the dialectic or a series of arguments that provide a spectrum of options to consider in making decisions.

Leonhard is not humble or timid. He unabashedly states his hopes that



his book will stand the test of time, similar to that of Thucydides' *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (Penguin Classics, New York, 1986, $12.95). While this is an admirable goal, it could easily be interpreted as misplaced arrogance.

Throughout the book Leonhard openly criticizes senior Army leaders, accusing them of not adapting to

the new environment of technology and the revolution in military affairs. The frequent attacks take away from the book's overall professionalism.

Despite these faults, the book provokes deep, healthy thought about the military profession and questions its basic principles. Without necessarily accepting that a revolution in military affairs is underway, most will agree that sensors, computers, communications and information technology will affect dramatically how the Army fights the next war. This assumption makes it critical to revisit the principles of war now. Leonhard methodically exposes what has changed in the conflict environment, logically discusses why the current principles have lost their value, then provides a conceptual framework for a new set of principles. I highly recommend the book.

MAJ John L. Gifford, ***USA,***
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LEARNING FROM CONFLICT: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador and the Drug War, Richard Duncan Downie, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998, 291 pages, $65.00.

In *Learning From Conflict,* a study of counterinsurgency and counterdrug doctrines and their implementation, Richard Duncan Downie bemoans the lack of innovation in the US Army's counterinsurgency doctrine despite repeated unsatisfactory operational results and the relatively rapid developments in counterdrug doctrine.

Downie analyzes Army doctrine as it relates to institutional learning and addresses the requisite internal and external conditions that bring about doctrinal change. To change doctrine, the Army must learn as an institution. Downie describes institutional learning as using "knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes."

Downie uses six analytical dimensions to measure doctrinal change: assumptions, program objectives and strategy, roles and responsibilities, analytical requirements, counterinsurgency force composition and organization, and management structure. These dimensions and Downie's analysis produce comprehensive statistics that identify forces producing doctrinal change within the Army. Downie also describes why, even though experiences provide reasons for change, institutional learning does not always occur.

MAJ Paul E. Snyder, ***USA,***
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



A DEVIL OF A WHIPPING: The Battle of Cowpens, Lawrence E. Babits, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 1998, 231 pages, $34.95.

As an ROTC instructor, I taught the Battle of the Cowpens in the Military History class. Before I read *A Devil of a Whipping*, I thought I knew the battle. Lawrence E. Babits, drawing from a variety of sources and using his experiences as a Revolutionary War re-enactor, explains how rates of march provide a foundation for timing the battle's various phases. Babits' use of pension applications as sources of information also is unique. The Pension Acts of 1810, 1818 and 1832 provide a wealth of information about who participated in the battle.

Using some basic assumptions, Babits draws several conclusions, such as the number of militia involved in the battle by state. From pensioners with wounds, he places militia units on the field and defines their participation in various segments of the battle. This method also answers questions about the numbers of troops involved as well as casualty figures.

Babits also details Confederate General Daniel Morgan's actions before and during the battle. Morgan's battle plan took advantage of General Sir Banastre Tarleton's impulsiveness, his own soldiers' strengths, their natural tendency to fire high when aiming uphill and the rifle's superior range. Morgan took all of this into consideration when he chose his ground. His plan allowed gaps in the battle line through which the militia could pass to reform. At these locations Morgan personally helped rally the militia with exemplary leadership.

The book's organization and maps add to overall understanding of the subject, and the bibliography is extensive. The notes are gems that add color and interest to the telling of the tale. I would warn against skipping them.

MAJ William T. Bohne, ***USA,***
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993, Jonathan M. Soffer, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998, 246 pages, $59.95.

Jonathan M. Soffer provides a remarkable account of one of the most venerable 20th-century US military leaders—General Matthew B. Ridgway. This book is not, nor should be considered, a chronicle of Ridgway's famous battles; it focuses on his ideology and politics. Soffer uses Ridgway's battles and military assignments as the vehicle to detail how this decisive, single-minded warrior professed his "corporatist" ideals through two world wars, the Cold War and into President Ronald Reagan's administration.

Soffer examines Ridgway's formative years, his first military assignments in Nicaragua and eventual command of the 82d Airborne Division and the 18th Airborne Corps during World War II. Soffer then focuses on Ridgway, the soldier-diplomat, who despite being a rough and somewhat apolitical officer survived political assignments during President Harry S. Truman's administration, assignment as the theater commander in Korea and involvement in the Reagan administration.

In later years, Ridgway persistently lobbied for a strong military

based on an industrial society. Despite years of decreasing military spending and reliance on technology, Ridgway never wavered. He warned against the reliance on technology, believing rather in preparing forces for limited wars.

The book traces the popularity of military corporatist ideology among military leaders and politicians in the mid-20th century. Ridgway thought officers should balance the relations between the social classes to ensure the correct production levels to fight the Cold War. He believed that without societal economic and moral support for the military, the outcome would be forlorn.

Despite Ridgway's persistence, his goals never truly materialized until the Reagan administration. Increases in defense spending and mutual cooperation with industry in the 1980s finally provided the necessary ingredients to build a military the Soviets could not match. More significant, the 1980s brought about a return to corporatism and the ability to fight and win limited wars.

Ridgway's strong command presence and his persistence in training forces for battle resonate today. As the Army pursues the Objective Force, are we again relying too much on technology?

MAJ Sean M. Jenkins, *USA*,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CYBERWAR 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality, Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth, eds., AFCEA International Press, Fairfax, VA, 1998, 403 pages, $29.95.

I strongly recommend *Cyberwar 2.0* to those who desire to broaden their understanding of the rapid societal changes brought about by the Information Age, which adds a new, troubling dimension to war and warfare. The rules of engagement are unknown, and the doctrine, weapons and targets are something of a mystery. However, the technology that is changing society and will create the Interim and Objective Forces (formerly called the Army After Next) leaves us vulnerable to a new threat—cyberwar.

Editors Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth compile essays from 30 government, industry and academic experts in four countries. The essays describe the Information Age's impact on society, economics, strategy, diplomacy and military affairs and offer a broad view of current debate and thought.

The essays that wrestle with the future strategic landscape should be of particular interest to military officers. Grand geostrategic alliances might be a thing of the past as the nature of wealth creation changes and as superrich sociopolitical entities emerge who need no territory, vast resources or large populations.

The essay "Out-Sourcing Command and Control" examines the US military's increasing reliance on civilian-based information infrastructure. The "contractor brigade" might become a reality. The essays Campen and Dearth present can only provoke fruitful thought and discussion on the future of the military profession.

MAJ William T. Sorrells, *USA*,
Germantown, Tennessee



FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN MANHOOD: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, Kristan L. Hoganson, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1998, 360 pages, $30.00.

Kristan L. Hoganson's book is an intellectually stimulating, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to reinterpret late 19th century US political culture and imperialism. The book's genesis lies in a June 1978 *American Historical Review* roundtable discussion titled "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book." Participants debated why the sudden rise and decline of US imperialism generates such poor treatment in history survey texts. The scholars approached the subject in various ways and enumerated several interpretive approaches.

Hoganson continues this discussion by categorizing the arguments as relating to economic ambitions, annexationist aspirations, strategic concerns, partisan posturing, humanitarian sympathies, psychic crises, Darwinian anxieties and contemporary racial convictions. She enters the dialogue by examining the period's rhetoric through a gendered lens.

The sheer number of possible explanations convinces Hoganson that some way must be found to develop them into an understandable whole. She asks, "Why did so many reasons for war converge at once?" The answer could lie in "the cultural roots of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars." However, the problem is how to relate "the amorphous stuff of culture to something as concrete as policy decisions." Hoganson's goal is to investigate how "manly policies gave gender beliefs the power to affect political decision-making."

Adding gender to the explanatory picture can help explain why all these reasons converged quickly and simultaneously, but adding gender does not "fundamentally change our understanding of the conflicts." Hoganson's goal is to do just that—change our understanding of these conflicts. Therefore, drawing on the insights of the field of gender studies, she uses that category as the "basic building block" to understand both the wars and late 19th century American political culture. In this she fails. The book focuses too narrowly on this one aspect.

Using gender per se as an analytic category does not open new interpretive horizons, but only emphasizes the Social Darwinist, militarist, scientific racist, muscular Christian and imperialist threads that run through late 19th century sociopolitical discourse. Her examination of this world view exemplifies what one sees when any culture redefines the world on its own terms, excluding and denigrating that which it does not approve.

Hoganson's conclusions and most of her evidence blunt her main interpretive point. Her nuanced analysis shows that gender is inadequate to support an interpretive framework by itself. It is, however, one of many significant threads running through the historical tapestry that help us understand the period in its own terms and evaluate it in ours. If used properly, gender can be a valuable analytic concept. Historians must remain conceptual opportunists in the effort to understand the meaning of the past and communicate it to a wider audience.

Lewis Bernstein, *Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

TARGET BOSNIA: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, Pascale Combelles-Siegel, CCRP Publications Distribution Center, Vienna, VA, 1998, 199 pages, out of print.

As we move from an industrial age into an information age, technology plays a bigger part in mission success. Battles that were once won by ground forces alone can now be influenced and possibly won through the media. This is even truer in peace support operations.

In *Target Bosnia* the author looks at how planning factors for such operations support overall mission success. Pascale Combelles-Siegel's thesis, although not clearly stated, is that information activities, if properly planned and focused, influence the battlefield and are a combat multiplier we cannot neglect.

Combelles-Siegel breaks the book into clear segments to explain information activities and how they integrate into the overall mission. She first looks at the three pillars of information activities—public information, psychological operations and civil-military cooperation information—then at how they are coordinated throughout the command and international organizations. Finally, she assesses the effectiveness of such operations and implications for future operations.

The book is generally easy to read, and the key points and their importance are clearly identified. In the last chapter, Combelles-Siegel summarizes the lessons from the information campaign in Bosnia and reiterates the importance of information activities on the battlefield.

MAJ Kurt J. Pinkerton, *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*



TARGET HIROSHIMA, Albert B. Christman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998, 305 pages, $29.95.

In *Target Hiroshima,* Albert B. Christman reveals the true story of an unsung hero—Rear Admiral William "Deak" Parsons—a man of honor, uncommon selfless service and intense commitment to mission. Using factual accounts from key figures and public and private documents, Christman conclusively shows Parsons as the prime force linking civilian scientists, military developers and advanced technologies and high-technology weapons. This synergy preserved US military strength and brought World War II to an end in the Pacific.

Parsons was a zealous advocate of microwave radar for naval gunfire control and air defense. As liaison between the Navy Research Laboratory and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, he actively championed the limited results of previous tests to secure further testing. But, because of ignorance, bureaucracy or compartmentalization, additional testing was not approved. Years later, Parsons stated that the Navy's two-year delay in pursuing radar technology cost many lives at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

As an experimental officer at Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia, Parsons skillfully led a team of scientists who developed the "smart" fuze—a weapon advance that was ready in time for prosecuting war. Admiral Arleigh Burke later said that if it had not been for those fuzes, ship losses and casualties in the last half of the war would have been much higher.

Parsons was also involved with the military-scientific-industrial collaboration for the atomic bomb's production. As assistant director and chief for ordnance at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, Parsons spent two years pushing, molding and motivating a team of scientists, engineers and military personnel to produce, test and deliver the world's most powerful weapon. Although Colonel Paul Tibbets piloted the *Enola Gay* on the Hiroshima mission, Parsons was the mission's bomb commander. He took the atomic bomb from conception to testing to final delivery.

Parsons did more than any other US military person to field technological advances when they were needed to end the war. He was dedicated to saving US lives in combat and ending war as quickly and decisively as possible through technology. He had a clear grasp of scientific, engineering, ordnance and personnel challenges and was able to overcome them with persistence and team building.

Perhaps the only thing that detracts from this book is its title. "Target Hiroshima" suggests that the book centers on the rationale for targeting the city of Hiroshima or the ethical ramifications of atomic warfare. The book centers on neither. A more appropriate title would have been, "The Deak Parsons Story: Military Innovator of the 20th Century."

MAJ James M. Williams, *USA, Helena, Georgia*

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, Stephen J. Cimbala, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998, 235 pages, $55.00.

In *The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence,* Stephen J. Cimbala compares the diplomatic crisis preceding World War I in August 1914 to the US-Soviet showdown during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October

1962. He weighs the more classical combatant role of naval forces against President John F. Kennedy's use of them to show restrained power.

Cimbala also discusses continuing Russian dependence on nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the START process, proliferation of nuclear weapons among aspiring regional powers, the implications of information warfare on nuclear deterrence and perceptions of limited nuclear war in the Old and New World Orders. With lessons derived from the past and in light of current practices, he argues that the apparent inscrutability of escalation management, not nuclear deterrence as intended, was responsible for the peace among the great powers since 1945.

Cimbala says that World War I offers an example of "miscalculation by European national leaders regarding the expected social and political consequences of general war." In contrast, and based on conclusive nuclear research and testing, Cold War US and Soviet command authorities clearly understood the destruction that would result should either choose to cross the nuclear threshold. Therefore, nuclear deterrence depended on uncertainty, but not on the uncertainty of consequences. The credibility of nuclear deterrence depended on decision-making uncertainty within the strategic commands during crises.

Lacking confidence in their ability to control the dynamics of escalation and avoid crisis-management failure, the United States and the Soviet Union stepped back from the nuclear brink. The uncertainty of potentially flawed decision making and failed nuclear diplomacy kept US and Soviet leaders from accepting too much risk.

Cimbala provides sound research that greatly contributes to ongoing discussions of nuclear deterrence. His work regarding information warfare in the continuing nuclear age warrants further consideration by those who would meld technology and policy into a credible national defense posture.

MAJ Robert G. Cheatham Jr., *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE LOST ART OF DECLARING WAR, Brien Hallett, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL, 1998, 178 pages, $36.95.

Article I, section 8, of the US Constitution begins: "The Congress shall have the power" and continues, in clause 11, "to declare war. . . ." On its surface, the statement appears unambiguous. Why, then, has the United States actually declared war on so few occasions, particularly in contrast to the much more frequent use of military force abroad? Moreover, why has Congress abdicated this responsibility and the associated authority? These questions have nagged me for some time and is why I read this book. Hallett, an assistant professor at the Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace at the University of Hawaii and a US Marine Corps platoon commander and staff officer in Vietnam, had similar qualms on this issue and does a superb job of answering my questions.

Explaining why declaring war has become a "lost art" only sets the conditions for Hallett's real goal, which he clearly states in the book's first sentence: "My purpose is to rethink the power to declare war." Rather than rehash the old debate of Executive versus Legislative powers, Hallett tackles the subject by examining the nature and purposes of a declaration of war. He concludes, convincingly, that the primary purposes are to articulate the reasons for resorting to war and its strategic aims. He fully examines these purposes by considering history, democratic theory and the role of the people's representatives.

This comprehensive treatment is the great strength of Hallett's work. He sets the stage for his prescription by neatly laying out what it means to have the power to declare war, from where that power is derived and why that power resides or should reside with the people's representatives in Congress.

Hallett "attempts to imagine ways in which the people's representatives might discharge their constitutional responsibility to declare war." In short, what he argues for, and provides a framework to achieve, is greater accountability.

MAJ Richard A. Harfst, *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

2000 MacArthur Writing Competition Winners

The US Army Command and General Staff College is proud to announce this year's *Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition* winners.

1st Place: **Major Fred Krawchuk**
"Leadership Development: The Practices and Embodiment of Thoughtful Action"

2nd Place: **Major Linda C. Jantzen**
"Taking Charge of Technology: A Leader's Guide to the Information Age"

3rd Place: **Major Jeffrey A. Bradford**
"MacArthur, Inchon and the Art of Battle Command"

Each year the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation sponsors a writing competition open to all resident class members. The competition honors MacArthur and the precepts of "Duty, Honor, Country," by which he lived. Contest entries can address any aspect of military leadership.

The top three writers were recognized in a ceremony held 25 May 2000 and were awarded cash prizes of $250 for first place, $150 for second and $75 for third place. In addition, each writer received a special edition of MacArthur's book *Reminiscences*: *General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.*

MR Letters

Photo Identification

I have just read the March-April 2000 issue of *Military Review* and, as usual, enjoyed it very much. I do, however, have one correction in an otherwise fine article ("Highway to Basra and the Ethics of Pursuit" by Stacy R. Obenhaus). The photo caption on page 53 identifies several M-8 armored cars as being from Combat Command A of the 7th Armored Division and as having been destroyed north of Poteau on 18 December 1944. The vehicles' front unit markings show them as being from the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of 1st Army. The 18th and its sister squadron were employed northeast of the area when the fight began. Much of both units' equipment was destroyed.

Combat Command A received the task of taking Poteau. It did so, was driven out, then retook the town from the 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Combat Command R had earlier reported that the road beyond Poteau was terrifically jammed with vehicles of various units that had been in the area before the German offensive.

By 19 December 1944, the remnants of the 14th Cavalry Group, of which the 18th was part, formed into a provisional troop and began screening for Combat Command R to the north. This confirms that the vehicles in the photo were of the 18th Cavalry, as the markings indicate, and not Combat Command A, which fought back and forth in the area of Poteau.

GEN William A. Knowlton, ***USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia***

Editor's Note: MR *regrets the error. We should have read the photo and not the original caption.*

The Doctrinal Problem

Doctrine is a pressing problem for the US Army. Few soldiers study, understand, practice or are tested on doctrine, and few have a working knowledge of its vocabulary. Most soldiers would probably not consider this subject to be an issue and are fairly oblivious to its ramifications.

Over the last five years I have watched more than 70 brigades and their staffs in operation. I have visited the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as an observer of Active and Reserve Component rotations. I have participated in conferences either discussing key doctrine manuals or helping to write them. I have seen close up how the process works and who is writing doctrine.

A recent influx of new words can be traced directly to the NTC and JRTC. "Counterreconaissance" ranks among the most used and least understood words in our professional vocabulary. In US Army Field Manual 71-100, *Division Engineer Combat Operations,* counterreconnaissance is defined as a security operation. Although this is supposedly understood, we still talk about it as if it were a distinct and separate mission.

Although the term "penetration box" is now used in several contexts, officially the term does not exist. The closest word in doctrine is "breach." When I have pointed out the discrepancy, the response has been, "That's what the commander wants to call it." Although commanders are good officers in positions of responsibility based on demonstrated performance, they cannot arbitrarily change or add to doctrine. A commander's staff has the responsibility to call this out to the commander's attention and recommend the correct word or term.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) constantly finds a disconnect between the use of the words "seize" and "secure." The disconnect is primarily caused by not understanding definitions then inadvertently using one when meaning the other. "Defeat" and "destroy" also puzzle staffs and commanders. The artillery version of "destroy" (reduce by 30 percent) is not always the infantry, armor or aviation meaning. "Destroy" means different things to different branches; therefore, it would be wise to permanently resolve what it means across services.

At NTC, while discussing problems concerning doctrine, observers/controllers (OCs) told me their mission was not to teach doctrine. These captains and majors find themselves in a time-constrained environment where adhering to doctrine "would be great," but they have to get on with the "real" work. These officers are not slackers; they work long hours in a hostile environment. In the world's greatest training arena we do not allow time to train and sustain our staffs and commanders in our professional fundamentals.

At JRTC, highly motivated young officers also consider doctrine confining. They do not possess a firm understanding of basic doctrine. For example, one sincere captain had developed a decision-making system based on the results of targeting meetings. The results were noted on a matrix and became the next day's orders. The young soldier's system was clearly not based on the five-paragraph operation order (OPORD). As another example, a senior OC said, during an after-action review, that the military decision-making process (MDMP) was a "good technique." The MDMP is not only a good technique; it is doctrine.

At the combat training centers (CTCs), the MDMP was routinely attacked as being too cumbersome, but neither the OCs nor the training staff actually understood the process. In particular, wargaming methods were not understood or routinely practiced. We justify the use of a single or "focused" course of action (COA) because "we do not have time" to develop others. The premise of a focused COA is based on combat requirements, a seasoned commander and a fully trained staff. Manuals should reflect that this type of focused COA should only be used in combat. Except in unusual circumstances, NTC and JRTC are not the correct environment in which to use focused COAs.

Training units have an almost overwhelming urge to use matrix

orders, and OCs are reluctant to prohibit their use. Using current doctrine should be nonnegotiable at the CTCs. The argument about time is valid, but if we cannot practice doctrine at the CTCs, where do we practice?

Recently I explained to a Command and General Staff College (CGSC) graduate that a brigade's cross-FLOT (forward line of own troops) air assault was not a deep attack. Another recent graduate could not be moved from the belief that once a commander designates a main effort it could not be shifted to another unit. I might have had the misfortune to encounter the only two majors who did not understand tactics fundamentals, but I do not believe so.

What should we do? There should be comprehensive exams on doctrine beginning in the basic courses and continuing through CGSC. At each level, students should be required to demonstrate a grasp of basic doctrine and a clear understanding of definitions and important terms. A CGSC graduate should be a doctrine and tactics expert. A graduate not in the combat arms should also display a similar grasp of combat support or combat service support doctrine. This testing might strain students, but the gain would easily outweigh the cost.

We should teach doctrine at the CTCs and demand it be followed with regard to OPORD format using the MDMP. These great training assets should stress Army standards so we can all understand any order any headquarters issues. To ensure that correct, current doctrine is taught and enforced in all training environments, the Army should require each school or agency to visit and assess sites where doctrine is used.

The solution is fairly straightforward—devote ourselves to an appropriate study of doctrine, not just briefly flipping through the manuals before a CTC rotation or a warfighter exercise.

LTC Jack E. Mundstock, ***USA,***
28th Field Training Group,
Fort Meade, Maryland

Marshall Myth Revisited

I appreciate LTC Albert N. Garland's comments in the "Letters" section of the May-June 2000 issue of *Military Review*, about my article "Harnessing Thunderbolts" (January-February 2000). However, he has taken me to task unfairly in certain areas because of his lack of information regarding my use of S.L.A. Marshall's observations on the battlefield behavior of soldiers during World War II and the Korean War. My rather brief mention of Marshall's findings is supplemented by my own substantial research in this area and corroborated by information other than Marshall's own. The remark was meant to provide some recognizable, if controversial, support for my overall argument that post-World War II improvements to control soldiers during combat are still evident today.

I largely agree with Garland's comments regarding Marshall's suspect methodology. I, my peers and fellow West Point instructors are fully aware of recent literature, appearing in a variety of forums, that effectively debunks Marshall's methodology. I agree that Marshall's data were not properly obtained in the scientific sense. Garland should rest knowing that US Military Academy cadets are not required to spout *Men Against Fire* dogma before graduating.

MAJ Kelly C. Jordan, ***USA,***
2d Infantry Division,
Republic of Korea